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Establishing Commercial Impracticability Based on Cost Overruns

Contractors may sometimes encounter unforeseen conditions that make a government contract commercially impracticable because performance would cause extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or loss. Unless the contractor has assumed the risk of the unforeseen condition, a finding of commercial impracticability excuses the contractor from performing. In other situations, commercial impracticability may be treated as a constructive change, warranting an equitable adjustment due to the substantial, unforeseen costs imposed upon the contractor. Whether the performance of a contract would be commercially impracticable is a question of fact to be resolved on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, adjudicative forums have consistently declined to adopt a bright-line rule providing that a certain percentage of cost overrun automatically constitutes commercial impracticability. However, due to the potential for abuse, the standard for establishing commercial impracticability is challenging to meet, and contractors are not entitled to relief merely because they are unable to sustain their profit margins.

In Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) No. 63615, a decision issued on May 19, 2025, the Board granted the agency summary judgment on the issue of commercial impracticability when the contractor suffered a 37% cost overrun on a construction contract. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) issued the underlying contract for construction work at Placement Area No. 10 in the Corpus Christi Ship Channel. The total adjusted contract price following all modifications was $11,046,369.04. During performance, the contractor encountered excessive erosion on the south side of the placement area. Subsequently, the work to address the erosion was added to the contract via two bilateral contract modifications addressing the inland and shoreline sides of the placement area, totaling $909,332.04. However, even after the modifications, the contractor continued to incur costs and expend additional resources. A year after the contract was deemed substantially complete, the contractor submitted certified claims asserting entitlement to roughly $3,560,723.65 in cost overruns for work associated with the first modification and $447,522.64 in cost overruns for the second modification. These claims were denied by the contracting officer (CO) in their entirety.

Among other counts of its complaint in the appeal before the ASBCA, the contractor alleged that the work associated with the modifications became commercially impracticable due to the continued excessive erosion. The contractor alleged that the work was commercially impracticable because unforeseen conditions had caused a 328% cost overrun. The contractor calculated the overrun by comparing the amount it spent to perform both modifications (~$4.1m) to its original estimate for the modification work (~$909k). Meanwhile, USACE asserted that the actual cost overrun was no more than 37%, which it calculated by comparing the total alleged cost of contract performance (~$15.1m) to the total adjusted contract price (~$11m). Thus, the contractor and USACE employed different methodologies to calculate the cost overrun. The contractor essentially compared a subset of the alleged actual costs to its initial estimate for the modified work. In contrast, the agency compared the total alleged actual costs to the total adjusted contract price. In resolving the issue of conflicting cost overrun calculation methodologies, the Board cited precedent from the Federal Circuit and its own past decisions, holding that commercial impracticability was more appropriately determined by comparing the total alleged cost of performance to the total contract price. In other words, the Board agreed with the agency’s calculation of the cost overrun as 37%.

Upon establishing the 37% cost overrun, the Board turned to the parties’ arguments regarding whether the overrun in the present case was sufficient to establish commercial impracticability. The agency cited several instances in which cost overruns greater than those in the present case were found insufficient to establish commercial impracticability. Specifically, the agency provided examples where cost overruns in excess of 50-70% were considered inadequate. The agency also demonstrated via examples the high bar a contractor had to meet to establish commercial impracticability based on cost overruns alone. For instance, the Board found commercial impracticability when the expected project cost rose to over $400 million rather than the originally planned $16.92 million. Thus, the agency maintained that the contractor’s 37% cost overrun in the present case, although significant, did not meet the high bar required in such cases. The ASBCA agreed with the agency, noting that the cases cited by the agency effectively demonstrated that cost overruns of a significantly greater magnitude than those alleged by the contractor were required to establish commercial impracticability. While the Board declined to adopt a bright-line rule that a 37% cost overrun could never be sufficient to constitute commercial impracticability, as it is a factual inquiry to be resolved on a case-by-case basis, it reminded the contractor that the standard for establishing commercial impracticability was nevertheless a rigorous one. Consequently, summary judgment was granted in favor of the agency on the issue of commercial impracticability.

Contractors may establish commercial impracticability by demonstrating that, due to unforeseen events, the contract can only be performed at excessive or unreasonable costs. In government contracts, commercial impracticability may be treated as a constructive change, warranting an equitable adjustment. However, due to the doctrine’s susceptibility to abuse, the standard for establishing commercial impracticability is a rigorous one. Notably, when calculating cost overruns in the context of commercial impracticability, contractors should compare the total alleged cost of performance to the total contract price. Furthermore, contractors should be mindful that commercial impracticability is a question of fact, not law, which means that it must be determined on a case-by-case basis. As demonstrated in this case, as well as the examples cited by the agency in support of its position, even cost overruns of 50-70% may not be considered exorbitant if unsupported by evidence of additional circumstances indicating impracticability. In any event, the doctrine cannot be invoked simply because the contractor’s incurred costs have become greater than initially contemplated.

This Federal Contract Claims Insight is provided as a general summary of the applicable law in the practice area and does not constitute legal advice. Contractors wishing to learn more are encouraged to consult the TILLIT LAW PLLC Client Portal or Contact Us to determine how the law would apply in a specific situation.

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The impracticability of performance doctrine is applicable in situations where the contractor’s performance of a contract, although not impossible, is rendered impracticable due to a problem encountered that was unforeseen at the time of formation of the contract. This impracticability of performance may be caused by a variety of unforeseen situations faced by the contractor during performance, including substantial increases in costs, significant problems encountered, or technological changes. Contractors must satisfy at least three conditions for the doctrine of impracticability to be applicable. First, the contractor must demonstrate that an unexpected condition or contingency occurred during the performance of the contract. Secondly, the contractor must show that it did not assume the risk of that contingency either expressly or through trade usage or custom. Finally, the contractor must prove that the unexpected condition or contingency caused the impracticability of performance.

Existence of Unexpected Condition or Contingency

The claim adjudicating forum may consider several factors to determine whether an unexpected condition or contingency exists. For instance, it may consider whether any other similarly situated contractor could have performed the contract. That is, whether the requirements or conditions are subjectively impractical for the contractor bringing the claim or impractical for any contractor in its position. Another factor to consider is the extent of the contractor’s efforts to meet the performance requirements in face of the contingency. Generally, the contractor must demonstrate that it was diligent and exhaustive in its attempts to perform the contract. In cases where the contractor alleges commercial impracticality or unfeasibility, it must prove that the performance costs would be so high that performing the contract would not make commercial sense. Notably, non-substantial increases in contract price will not result in successful commercial impracticability claims.

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Government officials often direct contractors to perform contract work in a specific manner not detailed in the contract. If such orders increase the scope of performance beyond the specifications of the contract, they may be construed as constructive changes. While such orders are generally given on the belief that they naturally fall within the scope of performance, they may nevertheless expand the scope of performance beyond the stated specifications. In such situations, contractors may be entitled to compensation for constructive change even if the accompanying government directive expressly states that it is not meant as a change order. Upon receipt of such directives, contractors must compare the new requirements with their existing contract specifications carefully and raise any scope creep issues promptly. Such a proactive approach may prove crucial in avoiding potential disputes and aid the contractor’s arguments in case of litigation.

Additional performance specifications not previously described in the contract may have the effect of increasing the scope of performance and add to costs incurred by the contractor. In such cases contractors may file a claim for increased costs. Such a claim was before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) in ASBCA No. 49648 pursuant to a contract for grounds maintenance services at the Arlington National Cemetery in Virginia. Under the contract, the contractor was required to furnish all labor, equipment, and materials for grounds maintenance supervision. While the contract specifications prohibited any contractor employees, vehicles, or equipment from infringing upon any government ceremonies or visitations, they did not expressly specify the distance contractor employees would have to maintain to comply with the no-infringement provision. Notably, the government had omitted provisions describing the exact no-infringement distances to maximize competition and avoid artificially high bids.

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The apportionment of risk of increased performance costs in a government contract depends primarily on the type of contract and its included clauses. If a specifically included contract clause assigns the financial risk of an event on either the government or the contractor, that clause usually dictates which party bears the increased costs of performance due to the occurrence of that event. However, even if the contract does not specifically contemplate the occurrence of a particular event, dispute adjudicative forums may look to relevant clauses included in the contract to determine which party must bear the increased costs. A good indicator of whether an included clause apportions the risk of increased performance costs on the government is if the clause points to the contract’s changes clause. In ASBCA No. 62712, a decision issued on October 2, 2024, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) held the government liable for increased costs associated with COVID-19-related quarantine of contractor employees due to a specifically included contract clause dictating the health and safety requirements under the contract. Notably, the relevant clause also pointed to the clause at Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.243-4 “Changes,” which was incorporated in the contract by reference.

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Firm-fixed-price contracts place maximum risk and full responsibility upon the contractor for all costs and resulting profit or loss incurred in performing a government contract. Fixed price contracts provide for a price that is not subject to any adjustment based on the contractor’s cost experience. Meanwhile, fixed-price contracts with economic price adjustments provide for upward or downward revisions of the stated contract price upon the occurrence of specified contingencies. There are three general types of price adjustments. First, price adjustments based on established prices provide for increases or decreases from an agreed-upon level in published prices of specific items. Second, adjustments based on actual costs of labor or materials contemplate increases or decreases in the specified costs of labor or materials actually experienced by the contractor during contract performance. Finally, adjustments based on labor or material cost indexes provide for increases or decreases in labor or material cost standards or indexes identified explicitly in the contract. In fixed-price contracts that do not provide for economic price adjustments, the contractor assumes the risk of unexpected costs not attributable to the government.

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Establishing Commercial Impracticability Based on Cost Overruns

TILLIT LAW Federal Contract Claims Insights