Solicitations for federal contracts performed in foreign countries may include definitive responsibility criteria mandating compliance with the laws and requirements of the host nation. Such criteria are considered objective standards, included in the solicitation to evaluate the offerors’ ability to perform the contract. Procuring agencies may restrict competition using such requirements if the definitive responsibility criteria are reasonably necessary to meet the government’s minimum needs. If an offeror fails to meet specifically included responsibility criteria mandating compliance with foreign laws, it is deemed non-responsible and considered ineligible for an award. Of course, offerors may challenge solicitation terms requiring compliance with foreign laws as unduly restrictive of competition. In such cases, the procuring agency must establish that the solicitation terms containing the responsibility criteria are reasonably necessary to meet its minimum needs. While the agency’s explanation must withstand logical scrutiny to be considered adequate, an offeror’s disagreement with the explanation alone does not demonstrate that the agency’s reasoning is unreasonable. Ultimately, when solicitations for contracts involving performance in foreign countries incorporate definitive responsibility criteria based on foreign laws, prospective offerors must either comply with the terms of the solicitation or demonstrate that the relevant requirements are clearly unreasonable.

Contractors may recover their increased costs of performance attributable to government-supplied defective specifications, provided they are design specifications rather than performance specifications. However, most government-furnished specifications contain both design and performance requirements. To recover under the Spearin doctrine, a contractor must prove that the requirement adversely affecting its performance relates to an area in which the government has expressly described how to perform. On the other hand, the contractor will be denied recovery if the government can show that the dispute concerns requirements that granted the contractor discretion to develop its own performance methodology to achieve necessary contractual objectives. Since it is not always clear whether the government has supplied a design or performance specification, the contractor may have to determine the amount of discretion granted by the specification. Such an analysis must be conducted by viewing the contract in its entirety and assessing the contractor’s overall discretion, along with the obligations imposed by the specification, before the requirement may be categorized as a design or performance specification. In this regard, the relevant inquiry may be the degree to which the contractor can exercise its ingenuity to achieve the contractual objectives and its ability to select the appropriate methodology to do so.

The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) requires full and open competition in federal procurement unless one of the limited exceptions enumerated in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) part 6 applies. Meanwhile, the General Services Administration (GSA) Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) program provides the government with a streamlined process for acquiring commonly used commercial supplies and services. These simplified procedures notwithstanding, CICA’s competition mandate applies to procurements conducted under the FSS program. In this regard, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has previously held that following the streamlined FSS procedures satisfies CICA’s competition requirements. It follows that when conflicting interpretations of a regulation governing competition in the FSS program are advanced, the interpretation consistent with the principles of CICA should prevail. One such long-recognized CICA principle provides that when concerns of administrative convenience or expediency are being weighed against ensuring full and open competition, the latter should be favored. Stated another way, mere administrative convenience or expediency should not provide a valid basis for restricting competition.

The rule of two requires that all contracts above the micro-purchase threshold be set-aside for small businesses, provided there is a reasonable expectation that two or more responsible small business concerns would submit offers at fair market prices and those offers are competitive in terms of quality and delivery. Under the recent overhaul of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the rule of two was retained for contracts above the simplified acquisition threshold (SAT), in addition to the statutory requirement that the rule apply to contracts between the micro-purchase and simplified acquisition thresholds. Notably, the revised FAR part 19 removes the requirement for the government to consider socioeconomic set-asides before small-business set-asides. Furthermore, the revised FAR 19.104, which was previously located at FAR 19.502-2, clarifies that, while small business set-asides are required at the master contract level under the rule of two, set-asides are encouraged but not mandatory at the order level for multiple-award contracts. It is also within the contracting officer’s (CO) discretion to follow the rule of two for orders issued under the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS).