Enacted in 1994, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) contains a “task order bar” that removes from the coverage of the Tucker Act any protests that relate to the issuance of a task or delivery order, the contract value of which does not meet the monetary threshold of $35 million for defense procurements and $10 million for non-defense procurements. Thus, if the contract value of a task or delivery order falls below these thresholds, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) will not entertain protests challenging the award due to lack of jurisdiction. The general rule for determining contract value for the purposes of establishing protest jurisdiction is to calculate the amount of the task or delivery order award. However, the GAO may, under unique circumstances, look beyond the amount of the award to establish the contract value for the purposes of jurisdiction. Such unique or extraordinary circumstances may include situations where the government utilized unconventional methods for compensating the contractor or employed atypical price evaluation techniques. Absent such unique circumstances, however, the GAO will not look beyond the value of the task or delivery order award to establish bid protest jurisdiction.

In order to have the necessary standing to file a protest at the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a protester must qualify as an interested party. The GAO’s bid protest regulations define an interested party as an actual or prospective bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of a contract or by the failure to award a contract. A protester may challenge the procuring agency’s evaluation of the awardee’s proposal as an interested party when there is a reasonable possibility that its proposal would be next in line for award if the protest is sustained. In post-award protests with an intervening offeror between the awardee and the protester, the protester’s economic interest may be considered too remote to qualify as an interested party to raise certain challenges against the awardee’s proposal. This is because when there is an intervening offeror that would be next in line for award should the protester’s protest be sustained, that intervening offeror is deemed to have a greater economic interest in the procurement. To establish standing in such procurements, the protester must challenge the agency’s evaluation of the intervening offeror to either show that it possesses the necessary economic interest to raise the pertinent challenges or otherwise demonstrate that its competitive position is subject to change based on the errors it identifies in the government’s evaluation.

It is a fundamental tenet of government contracts that procuring agencies treat all offerors equally. In this regard, adjudicative forums have long held that procuring agencies must provide all offerors with a common basis for preparing and submitting proposals. Such equal treatment necessarily requires the government to evaluate proposals of all offerors impartially and evenhandedly against the solicitation requirements and the evaluation criteria. Furthermore, once the evaluation is complete, agencies must adequately document their award decision, which should reflect the equal application of the stated criteria to all proposals. If an agency disparately evaluates offerors with respect to the same solicitation requirements, it may be subject to a post-award protest. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviews protests alleging disparate treatment by examining the record to determine whether the agency’s evaluation decision was reasonable and in accordance with the evaluation factors provided in the request for proposals (RFP). The GAO will sustain the protest and typically recommend a reevaluation if it determines that the agency treated the offerors’ proposals disparately or unequally, such as by evaluating the protester’s proposal using a stricter standard than the awardee’s proposal.