Shutterstock_2211056755.jpg

Obtaining Recovery Due to Incorrect Information Provided by the Government During Contract Formation

The government provides contractors with a variety of information during the solicitation process before a contract is awarded. Such information may be furnished through pre-award conferences, questions and answers, solicitation attachments, specifications, diagrams, drawings, contract provisions, etc. When the government misstates material facts during the contract formation process, it may later be liable under express provisions of the contract or for breaching an implied warranty that it furnishes correct information. In this regard, when the government provides incorrect representations and directs or expects prospective offerors to base their contract pricing on those misrepresentations, the government is responsible for any losses the contractor suffers as a result of its reliance on that information. In other words, when the government instructs offerors to base their pricing on data it furnishes, it assumes responsibility for ensuring that the data accurately reflects the conditions the contractor will encounter during performance. In such cases, as long as the contractor can demonstrate that the government's information was incorrect, it need not prove the government's intent to deceive or bad faith. Furthermore, the contractor may also not need to prove that the incorrect information was inadequately or negligently prepared.

In Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (CBCA) 2709, a decision issued in June 2013, the Board found the procuring agency liable for the contractor’s damages resulting from its supplying incorrect information and directing the contractor to base its pricing on that information during the solicitation phase of the procurement. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) awarded the underlying firm fixed-price contract to operate and maintain building equipment at six IRS facilities. The contract required basic services, including facility operation and performance of service calls and repairs. As relevant to the dispute, the request for proposals (RFP) included a technical exhibit that showed three months of actual service call data for the IRS Philadelphia facility, with a distribution of calls by duration. The historical data showed that about 88% of the calls were an hour or less, 11.4% were less than 4 hours, and 0.4% were less than 8 hours. When prospective offerors requested additional information, including historical data covering a longer period for several locations, including Philadelphia, the IRS stated that it had provided all available data, even though the agency had been performing the relevant work itself for the preceding five years. Additionally, the IRS informed offerors that the furnished data provided a reasonable basis to determine the materials and equipment required to support the service call work.

The contractor relied on the government-supplied service call data to prepare its pricing, which the Board later found to be reasonable because the IRS did not contest it. During contract performance, the contractor found that it was spending considerably more time per service call at the Philadelphia facility than noted in the government-furnished technical exhibit. Specifically, the contractor claimed that only 72.3% of the calls were an hour or less, 24.4% were 4 hours or less, and 2.4% were 8 hours or less. Additionally, the contractor reported that 0.7% of the calls lasted 8 to 12 hours, while 0.2% lasted more than 12 hours. Due to this distribution, the contractor stated that, over a two-and-a-half-year period, its actual costs were $480,165 more than its proposed price. In its certified claim, however, the contractor only claimed $308,879, owing to the IRS’s previously expressed concern that the extended time spent on the calls was due to lower skill levels of the contractor’s employees. The lower amount notwithstanding, the contracting officer (CO) denied the claim, citing the firm-fixed-price nature of the contract.

In the appeal that followed, the contractor pointed to the incorrect service call information provided by the IRS in the technical exhibit as the root cause of its costs exceeding its proposed pricing. Meanwhile, the government argued that the contractor had accepted maximum risk and full responsibility for all costs and resulting losses due to the firm-fixed-price nature of the contract. However, the Board disagreed with the government. It began its analysis by noting that the IRS specifically instructed prospective offerors to rely on the information in the RFP’s technical exhibit to determine their costs. In accordance with those instructions, the contractor relied on the technical exhibit’s service call data to develop its pricing, which the IRS did not contest as unreasonable or unrealistic. That is, the Board found that the IRS had directed the contractor to base its prices on material, incorrect representations contained in the technical exhibit, and the contractor did so to its detriment, as its actual cost experience during performance far exceeded its proposed pricing. Under these circumstances, the procuring agency was responsible for the contractor’s losses under the implied warranty that the material information it furnished to the contractor before award was correct. The Board noted that even though there was no special adjustment clause in the contract, the agency’s instructions to the contractor to base its pricing on the incorrect information essentially served the same purpose as such a clause. Consequently, the IRS was found liable for the contractor’s increased performance costs.

The government has an implied duty to provide correct information during the contract formation process. When the government provides material information that is later found incorrect, the contractor may recover any additional costs stemming from its reliance on that information in developing its proposed pricing. In such cases, the contractor need not demonstrate that the government intended to provide incorrect or misleading information during the contract formation phase. Similarly, the contractor need not prove that the information or data provided to it was negligently developed or that its performance was rendered commercially impracticable due to the incorrect data supplied by the government. These cases also differ from superior knowledge cases, in which the contractor argues that the government failed to disclose superior knowledge regarding the relevant aspect of performance. As demonstrated in the above case, the contractor need only show that the information supplied by the government was inaccurate, and that the government either expected or directed it to base its contract prices on that information. Finally, the contractor must also show that it relied on the government-supplied incorrect information to its detriment. In other words, the contractor must demonstrate that its increased costs of performance were due to the government's incorrect information. Once proven, the contractor may recover even in fixed-price settings and in the absence of a special adjustment clause or other similar express contract clauses.

This Federal Contract Claims Insight is provided as a general summary of the applicable law in the practice area and does not constitute legal advice. Contractors wishing to learn more are encouraged to consult the TILLIT LAW PLLC Client Portal or Contact Us to determine how the law would apply in a specific situation.

Related Insights

Shutterstock_2474143053.jpg

Firm-fixed-price contracts place maximum risk and full responsibility upon the contractor for all costs and resulting profit or loss incurred in performing a government contract. Fixed price contracts provide for a price that is not subject to any adjustment based on the contractor’s cost experience. Meanwhile, fixed-price contracts with economic price adjustments provide for upward or downward revisions of the stated contract price upon the occurrence of specified contingencies. There are three general types of price adjustments. First, price adjustments based on established prices provide for increases or decreases from an agreed-upon level in published prices of specific items. Second, adjustments based on actual costs of labor or materials contemplate increases or decreases in the specified costs of labor or materials actually experienced by the contractor during contract performance. Finally, adjustments based on labor or material cost indexes provide for increases or decreases in labor or material cost standards or indexes identified explicitly in the contract. In fixed-price contracts that do not provide for economic price adjustments, the contractor assumes the risk of unexpected costs not attributable to the government.

more
Shutterstock_2221857605.jpg

Contractors may sometimes encounter unforeseen conditions that make a government contract commercially impracticable because performance would cause extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or loss. Unless the contractor has assumed the risk of the unforeseen condition, a finding of commercial impracticability excuses the contractor from performing. In other situations, commercial impracticability may be treated as a constructive change, warranting an equitable adjustment due to the substantial, unforeseen costs imposed upon the contractor. Whether the performance of a contract would be commercially impracticable is a question of fact to be resolved on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, adjudicative forums have consistently declined to adopt a bright-line rule providing that a certain percentage of cost overrun automatically constitutes commercial impracticability. However, due to the potential for abuse, the standard for establishing commercial impracticability is challenging to meet, and contractors are not entitled to relief merely because they are unable to sustain their profit margins.

In Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) No. 63615, a decision issued on May 19, 2025, the Board granted the agency summary judgment on the issue of commercial impracticability when the contractor suffered a 37% cost overrun on a construction contract. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) issued the underlying contract for construction work at Placement Area No. 10 in the Corpus Christi Ship Channel. The total adjusted contract price following all modifications was $11,046,369.04. During performance, the contractor encountered excessive erosion on the south side of the placement area. Subsequently, the work to address the erosion was added to the contract via two bilateral contract modifications addressing the inland and shoreline sides of the placement area, totaling $909,332.04. However, even after the modifications, the contractor continued to incur costs and expend additional resources. A year after the contract was deemed substantially complete, the contractor submitted certified claims asserting entitlement to roughly $3,560,723.65 in cost overruns for work associated with the first modification and $447,522.64 in cost overruns for the second modification. These claims were denied by the contracting officer (CO) in their entirety.

more
Shutterstock_664567501-3.jpg

Under the Spearin doctrine, when the government furnishes design specifications directing the contractor on how to undertake performance on a contract, it provides an implied warranty that the contractor will be able to perform the contract satisfactorily if it adheres to the government’s specifications. The doctrine allows contractors to transfer to the government the risk of increased costs resulting from defective specifications. Notably, however, the Spearin doctrine only applies when the defective specifications are design specifications as opposed to performance specifications. Design specifications expressly describe how contract performance must be undertaken and do not permit the contractor to make any deviations. Meanwhile, performance specifications state the overall objectives that must be achieved but leave the decisions on how to achieve those objectives at the discretion of the contractor. Since design specifications do not allow deviations or grant the contractor discretion in achieving contractual objectives, the government implicitly warrants that design specifications are free from defects. Consequently, when the government’s design specifications are defective or result in unsatisfactory performance the government is deemed to have breached its implied warranty of specifications under the Spearin doctrine. In such cases, the contractor may recover all proximate costs stemming from the government’s breach.

more
Shutterstock_2096439724-2.jpg

The government may provide performance workload estimates during the solicitation phase to assist offerors in preparing their bids or proposals. If due care is not exercised in preparing these estimates and the contractor relies on them, the government may be liable for breach of contract. Due care requires the government to base its estimates on all relevant information reasonably available at the time. If the government fails to base its estimate on the latest available data or is otherwise negligent in preparing it, the contractor may recover any resulting damages. To prevail in such a claim, the contractor must show that it is more likely true than not true that the government’s estimate, on which it relied to prepare its offer, was inadequately or negligently prepared. In a typical case, the contractor must prove that the government’s negligent estimate misled it into submitting an unfairly low bid. The contractor may also need to demonstrate that the government had exclusive control over the information used in developing the estimate, which was unavailable to the contractor from other sources.

In Agility Defense & Government Services, Inc. v. United States, 847 F.3d 1345 (2017), the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the government was in breach of contract because it negligently estimated its requirements and the contractor relied on the government’s estimates. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) awarded the underlying contract for the disposal of surplus military property at Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices (DRMOs) upon the military’s departure from an area of operations. While the DLA usually handled the requirement internally, it became aware of planned troop movements, which were expected to cause a surge in workload that it was not equipped to handle without contracting out the requirement. During the solicitation phase, DLA issued several amendments relating to anticipated workload and costs. Under one such amendment, DLA provided offerors with a website that showed historical workload, including the number of military property items received for processing and the amount of scrap processed for each DRMO. In a later amendment, the DLA provided offerors with a workload chart that projected a stable workload for the first two years of the contract, followed by a progressive decline of 75%, 50%, and 30% in the option years three to five, respectively. The government also provided the contractor a workload baseline for each DRMO which utilized the same historical data.

more

Obtaining Recovery Due to Incorrect Information Provided by the Government During Contract Formation

TILLIT LAW Federal Contract Claims Insights