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Excess Costs of Reprocurement Claims and the Fulford Doctrine

The government has the right to terminate, in whole or in part, a government contract pursuant to the default clause when the contractor fails to perform its contractual obligations. The government may charge the defaulting contractor any excess costs it incurs in procuring replacement products or services beyond the contract price. Under Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 49.402-6, the contracting officer (CO) must repurchase the same or similar products or services against the defaulted contractor’s account as soon as practicable at as reasonable a price as practicable. If the repurchase is made at a price exceeding the price of the terminated products or services, the CO must issue a written demand to the defaulting contractor for the total amount of the excess. In order to establish an excess costs of reprocurement claim, the government must demonstrate that: (1) the reprocured supplies are the same as or similar to those involved in the termination; (2) it actually incurred the excess costs; and (3) the government acted reasonably to minimize the excess costs resulting from the default termination. If the government is unable to establish these elements, it may still proceed under a breach of contract theory, but it must then carry the heavier evidentiary burden of proving actual damages rather than relying on reprocurement costs. Significantly, the government’s claim for excess costs of reprocurement is considered distinct from the government’s default termination claim, and thus, has its own six-year statute of limitations once the excess reprocurement claim accrues under the Contract Disputes Act (CDA).

In M.E.S., Inc. v. United States, 104 Fed.Cl. 620 (2012), the Court of Federal Claims (COFC) recognized this distinction and found the government’s excess costs of reprocurement claim timely even when the claim was submitted ten years after the underlying default termination. The United States Postal Service (USPS) issued the contract for the construction of a postal facility in Riverhead, New York. The contract was terminated for default in June 1999 and was reprocured. The reprocurement project was completed in June 2005 with the government making a final payment in September 2006. In February 2009, the CO issued a final decision that the USPS was entitled to a little over $800,000 in excess reprocurement costs. In the suit that followed at the COFC, the contractor argued that the government’s claim was untimely because it was filed more than six years after the default termination decision. However, the COFC disagreed, noting that the excess reprocurement claims are unique and separate from their underlying default termination claims, to promote administrative efficiency by avoiding the need for the government to prove excess reprocurement costs using market value estimates. The COFC held that excess reprocurement cost claims accrue when the government makes the final payment to the replacement contractor. Since the government made the final payment to the replacement contractor for the Riverhead project in September 2006, its February 2009 claim was timely under the CDA because it was within six years of accrual. Notably, although found timely, the government’s claim was ultimately unsuccessful here due to a failure to mitigate excess costs owing to the government having waited too long to reprocure.

The Fulford doctrine further exhibits the uniqueness of excess costs of reprocurement claims, as well as their distinction from the underlying default termination decision. Under the Fulford doctrine, when the contractor fails to timely appeal a default termination, it may still challenge the merits of the government’s termination decision when appealing the later assessed excess costs of reprocurement. Thus, contractors may elect not to challenge a default termination decision until and unless excess costs of reprocurement are attached to the default. However, contractors should be mindful that the application of the Fulforddoctrine is limited to situations where the government files an excess costs of reprocurement claim against the contractor following the default. In J-Way S., Inc. v. United States, 516 F. Supp. 3d 84, 92 (D. Mass. 2021), aff'd sub nom. J-Way S., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 34 F.4th 40 (1st Cir. 2022), the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, while exercising admiralty jurisdiction over a CDA claim involving a government maritime contract involving dredging, held that the Fulford doctrine did not apply to permit a contractor to bring its time-barred challenge to a default termination decision. In that case, the defaulted contractor argued for the application of the Fulford doctrine as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) had hired a replacement contractor following default that was being paid by a surety. The surety in turn was assessing those reprocurement costs against the contractor. However, the District Court declined to extend the Fulford doctrine to this scenario because the USACE had not filed an excess costs of reprocurement claim against the defaulted contractor. The decision was later affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

Following a termination for default, the government may file a claim for excess costs of reprocurement to recover costs incurred in excess of the contract price from the defaulted contractor. The government must establish three elements to successfully assess excess costs of reprocurement, including the reasonable mitigation of excess costs. Excess costs of reprocurement claims are considered separate from the government claims for termination for default. As a result, these claims accrue later than the government’s default termination claims when a final payment is made to a replacement contractor. This later accrual date supports administrative efficiencies by avoiding the need for the government to prove its excess reprocurement costs using market value estimates. However, the government is still obligated to complete the reprocurement process at a reasonable price and file its excess costs of reprocurement claim against the defaulted contractor as soon as practicable. If the government waits too long to reprocure, it may fail to satisfy the requirements to establish an excess costs of reprocurement claim and may be forced to proceed under a more evidentiarily burdensome breach of contract theory. The Fulford doctrine may provide an alternative avenue to appeal a default termination for contractors that fail to timely appeal the termination decision, either because they expect no monetary damages to attach or because they miss the appeals deadline. Under the doctrine, defaulted contractors may also challenge the appropriateness of the default termination decision when appealing the government’s excess costs of reprocurement claim. While the Fulford doctrine may prove helpful, contractors should nevertheless be mindful of its limited applicability when electing to forego a timely appeal to a default termination.

This Federal Procurement Insight is provided as a general summary of the applicable law in the practice area and does not constitute legal advice. Contractors wishing to learn more are encouraged to consult the TILLIT LAW PLLC Client Portal or Contact Us to determine how the law would apply in a specific situation.

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The government may terminate a federal contract if the contractor fails to meet its contractual obligations. The contracting officer (CO), in such cases, issues a final decision terminating the contract for default and outlines the reasons for the default. In the event of a termination for default, the government is only liable to the contractor for the portion of the contract that was already performed. While the CO may exercise discretion to terminate a contract for default, such a decision is appealable to the Board of Contract Appeals or the Court of Federal Claims (COFC) pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act (CDA). The CO’s decision to terminate may be set aside by the adjudicative forum if it is arbitrary, capricious, or constitutes an abuse of the CO’s discretion. For instance, a decision to terminate for default may be arbitrary and capricious if there is a lack of nexus between the CO’s decision to terminate the contract for default and the contractor’s performance on the contract. In such situations, while the concerned adjudicative forum may lack the ability to provide injunctive relief, it may nevertheless convert the CO’s default termination to one for the government’s convenience.

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The government retains the right to terminate a contract for default when the contractor fails to meet its performance obligations. The default termination, commonly considered one of the most undesirable outcomes for contractors, may nevertheless be converted into a termination for the government’s convenience if, on appeal, the government fails to prove that its default termination decision was justifiable. Notably, when the contractor appeals the government’s decision to terminate its contract for default, it is the government’s burden to prove default termination in the first instance. In other words, the government must demonstrate the correctness of its actions in terminating a contract for default. When contract modifications change the terms of the original contract such that the government’s default termination decision is no longer justified under the modified contract, adjudicative forums will typically convert the default termination to one for the convenience of the government, citing the change in circumstances from contract award to termination.

The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) in ASBCA 58866 and ASBCA 58867 converted the Army’s terminations for default for two similar contracts into terminations for convenience due to changes in the terms of the contracts due to later modifications. The Army awarded the underlying contracts for the acquisition of thousands of foreign language test items to assess the proficiency of military linguists. The contracts included the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.212-4 clause: “Contract Terms and Conditions—Commercial Products and Commercial Services.” During the performance, the government was only responsible for paying for the items it accepted, with no apparent definition of what constituted an acceptable item, presumably leaving the acceptability determination at the government’s discretion. The government retained intellectual property rights in both accepted and rejected items as the contracts provided the government sole ownership and exclusive rights to the deliverables. After the contracts were awarded to the same contractor, the Army issued nearly identical modifications, stating that any foreign language test items still required under the contracts but not accepted by the government would be “automatically descoped” from the contract. The Army eventually terminated the contracts for default, citing the contractor’s failure to provide the agreed-upon number of acceptable items.

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The government has the right to terminate a contract under the default clause for the contractor’s unexcused failure to meet its performance obligations. In making the default termination decision, it is the responsibility of the contracting officer (CO) to exercise sound business judgment while generally considering the seven factors listed in Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 49.402-3(f), including the totality of the circumstances. Once default is established, the burden shifts to the contractor to prove that its failure to meet contractual obligations was excusable. Although in the vast majority of cases the government’s decision to terminate for default is considered proper if the government has a right to terminate and the appropriate termination procedures are followed, there may be instances where the government’s motive to terminate may be implicated, such as when agency actions surrounding the termination amount to bad faith in the administration of the contract. In such cases, the contractor must present evidence that the government had some specific intent to injure it to overcome the presumption that government officials act in good faith. Such evidence showing a specific intent to injure the contractor satisfies the well-nigh irrefragable proof standard that must be met to show the government’s bad faith. This standard is considered higher than the legal standard necessary to prove arbitrary and capricious decisions of the government. Thus, if the contractor can establish that the government had some specific intent to injure it, the termination decision, if tainted by bad faith, may be considered arbitrary and capricious and the default termination may be converted into one for the government’s convenience.

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Excess Costs of Reprocurement Claims and the Fulford Doctrine

TILLIT LAW Federal Procurement Insights