FI2_BP_shutterstock_116561050.jpg

Protests Alleging Lack of Full & Open Competition

Full and open competition is a fundamental tenet of the U.S. Federal Procurement system. The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 guarantees full and open competition to contractors competing for federal government contracts. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) part 6 and its various subparts implement CICA. Notably, FAR subpart 6.2 provides for full and open competition after set-asides are implemented to narrow sources. Meanwhile, FAR Subpart 6.3 provides seven limited exceptions to full and open competition listed in subsections 6.302–1 through 6.302–7. Issues arising from the government’s application of exceptions to full and open competition listed in FAR 6.3 form the basis for bid protests. When avoiding full and open competition by implicating one of the seven narrow exceptions provided in FAR 6.302, contracting officers (COs) and government officials must meet specifically enumerated procedural requirements. For instance, when invoking an exception listed in FAR 6.302, agencies must execute a Justification and Approval (J&A) or Determination and Findings (D&F) document setting forth the basis for the procurement not being subject to full and open competition. Contractors looking to file a pre-award protest due to a lack of full and open competition may challenge the agency’s rationale in the J&A and D&F documents as legally insufficient.

Agencies need not provide full and open competition mandated by CICA under the following narrowly interpreted exceptions.

  • In procurements where there is only one responsible source. Under FAR 6.302–1, agencies may avoid competing contracts on a full and open basis when the products or services required are available from only one responsible source or, for DoD, NASA, and the Coast Guard, from only one or a limited number of responsible sources, and no other type of supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements.
  • In procurements with unusual and compelling urgency. Under FAR 6.302–2, agencies need not provide full and open competition in situations in which doing so would seriously injure the government’s interests due to circumstances requiring unusual and compelling urgency. Significantly, the period of performance for contracts awarded using this exception may not exceed the time necessary to meet the unusual or compelling urgency and make a competitive award. In addition, the contract’s period of performance, including all options under this exception, may not exceed one year unless the head of the agency determines that exceptional circumstances apply.
  • In procurements involving industrial mobilization, specialized research capabilities, or expert services. Under FAR 6.302–3, agencies need not provide full and open competition to maintain a supply of products or services in case of a national emergency or to achieve industrial mobilization. Additionally, agencies may avoid full and open competition under this section to establish or maintain essential engineering research or development capabilities and to acquire the services of an expert for litigation.
  • In procurements subject to international agreements. FAR 6.302–4 permits agencies to use other than competitive procedures when the terms of an international agreement or treaty preclude full and open competition. Under this section, an exception to full and open competition applies when a foreign sovereign reimburses the implementing agency costs of acquiring goods or services and in projects funded with nonrepayable foreign military funds.
  • In procurements expressly authorized or required by statute. Under FAR 6.302–5, agencies need not provide full and open competition when a statute expressly requires or allows procuring products or services from a specified source or another agency. The exception under this section also permits non-competitive procurement procedures for brand-name commercial products for authorized resale.
  • In procurements where disclosure of the agency’s needs would compromise national security. Under the exception to full and open competition outlined in FAR 6.302–6, agencies are not required to utilize competitive procedures in procurements in which disclosing the agency’s needs would compromise the national security interests of the United States. However, this authority cannot be used merely because the acquisition is classified.
  • In procurements involving the public interest exception. FAR 6.302–7 provides agency heads the non-delegable authority to circumvent full and open competition with their prior written authorization, a D&F document, and at least a 30-day notice to Congress of the public interest determination.

Full and open competition, as guaranteed by CICA, is a cornerstone of federal procurement and helps ensure that the government spends taxpayer dollars responsibly. Limited exceptions listed in FAR subpart 6.3 permit agencies to forego full and open competition under specific circumstances. These exceptions include procurements with only one viable source, urgent needs, specialized requirements, international agreements, statutory mandates, national security concerns, and when foregoing competition is in the public interest. Notably, the exemptions listed in FAR 6.302–1 through FAR 6.302–6 require compliance with FAR 6.303, but the public interest exception in FAR 6.303–7 does not . Instead, the public interest exception requires a written determination made under FAR Subpart 1.7. While some of these exceptions are invoked and protested more often than others, understanding these exceptions and their procedural requirements is critical for contractors filing protests alleging a lack of full and open competition. By understanding the requirement of full and open competition, along with the limited exceptions in FAR 6.3, contractors may challenge non-competitive procurements for not meeting the required criteria of a particular exception. Finally, contractors may also file protests in cases where the government’s J&A and D&F documentation is legally or procedurally deficient.

This Bid Protests Insight provides a general summary of the applicable law in the practice area and does not constitute legal advice. Contractors wishing to learn more are encouraged to consult the TILLIT LAW PLLC Client Portal or Contact Us to determine how the law would apply in a specific situation.

Related Insights

TLF-Bid-Protest-Insight-10.jpg

Acquisition planning on U.S. federal contracts requires the contracting activity to coordinate and integrate the efforts of all personnel responsible for the acquisition via a comprehensive plan that fulfills the government’s requirements in a timely manner and at reasonable cost. The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984, implemented by Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 6, mandates full and open competition in federal procurement. Consequently, while there are limited exceptions enumerated in FAR § 6.3, federal agencies must generally use competitive procedures in procuring products and services. Furthermore, federal agencies are expressly prohibited from entering contracts for property or services by utilizing non-competitive procedures when they have failed to properly plan the procurement in advance.

Contractors looking to challenge the Government’s use of non-competitive procedures in such improperly planned procurements must be prepared to demonstrate that the agency’s decision was unreasonable under the particular circumstances of that procurement. In 2014, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), an agency under the Department of Interior (DOI), was involved in a procurement contract for technology services. The procurement at issue was a Buy Indian Set-Aside conducted under the Buy Indian Act of 1910, and the eventual contract was awarded to an eligible non-incumbent contractor. However, a week before the conclusion of the predecessor contract, the incumbent contractor timely protested the award at the Government Accountability Office (GAO). In response, the BIA informed the GAO that it intended to take corrective action and requested that the GAO dismiss the incumbent’s protest.

more
TLF-Bid-Protest-Insight-46.jpg

In procurement parlance, insourcing refers to an organizational decision to perform the work internally instead of procuring it from outside sources. As procuring entities, government agencies may, from time to time, decide to internally perform work that was previously contracted out via competitive procedures or otherwise choose to perform new work using agency employees and resources. While such occasions are relatively rare, contractors may need to challenge such government decisions to insource work. A potential example of such a scenario could involve a contractor challenging an agency’s decision not to issue a follow-on contract on which the contractor is the incumbent due to the agency’s decision to perform the work internally using government employees.

Protesting such insourcing decisions involves a situation in which choosing one protest forum over another may prove advantageous for prospective protestors. This is because when reviewing insourcing decisions, the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) bid protest jurisdiction may be somewhat limited compared to that of the Court of Federal Claims (COFC). For instance, while the GAO routinely reviews agency decisions to cancel procurements to determine whether the cancellations were reasonable, it has been reticent to review such cancellations under its bid protest function when the work under canceled procurement is to be performed by government employees. This is because the GAO, a part of the legislative branch of the government, considers such insourcing decisions to be within the purview of government discretion and a matter of executive branch policy.

more
TLF-Bid-Protest-Insight-71.jpg

Government agencies must document their evaluations decisions in sufficient detail to provide a reasonable basis to support an award. When a protestor challenges the reasonableness of the government’s evaluation in the form of a bid protest, adjudicative forums such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) first question whether the government’s evaluation is adequately documented before determining whether the evaluation is consistent with the solicitation’s stated evaluation criteria. Therefore, when an agency fails to document its evaluation or retain evaluation materials, it bears the risk that there may not be sufficiently detailed supporting rationale in the record for the adjudicative forum to conclude that the government had a reasonable basis for the award decision. In such cases, the GAO will typically sustain the protest challenging the government’s evaluation decision and recommend that the agency reevaluate the proposals and sufficiently document its rationale. The adjudicative forum will also generally recommend that the procuring agency terminate the awarded contract for the government's convenience if as a result of the reevaluation, an offeror other than the awardee is in line for the award.

more
Shutterstock_1425752561.jpg

Federal agencies have broad discretion in determining whether to cancel a solicitation and may typically do so, provided they can establish a reasonable basis for their cancellation decision. Thus, the government may properly cancel a solicitation for various reasons anytime during the evaluation phase or even during an ongoing bid protest, as long as there is a reasonable basis for doing so. In reviewing an agency’s cancellation decision for reasonableness during a bid protest, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) verifies if the cancellation is based on a valid reason that is sufficiently documented and within the agency’s discretion. Thus, if a protest alleges that the agency’s stated reason for canceling the solicitation is merely pre-textual, the GAO will thoroughly evaluate the cancellation decision to ensure it was reasonable and well-documented. Notably, procuring agencies are not permitted to cancel a solicitation for an invalid reason, such as to circumvent adequate competition or to avoid resolving a bid protest.

In B-413924, the GAO sustained such a bid protest where the protestor alleged that the agency’s stated rationale for canceling the solicitation was pre-textual and that the agency’s actual motivation was to subvert competition and award the contract to the incumbent on a sole-source basis. The canceled solicitation subject to the protest was issued on a lowest-price-technically-acceptable (LPTA) basis by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for laundry services for its Los Angeles, Loma Linda, and Long Beach hospitals. After the closing date for the submission of quotations had passed, the VA reopened the solicitation and issued an amendment to increase the maximum award amount from $2.5M to $10M. Once the protestor submitted a revised quotation in response to the amended solicitation, it received a notice that the VA had decided to cancel the solicitation because it received “legal guidance” to do so. Upon canceling the solicitation, the VA issued the incumbent contractor a $1.7M extension.

more

Filing a Pre-Award Bid Protest Due to Lack of Full & Open Competition

TILLIT LAW Bid Protest Insights