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Unpacking the Covenant Against Contingent Fees in Federal Contracting

Federal statutes, regulations, and public policy strictly prohibit contractors from exerting improper influence in their attempts to secure government contracts. Such improper influence is defined as any influence that induces or tends to induce a government official to act regarding a government contract on any basis other than the merits of the matter. While there are many ways in which a contractor may exert improper influence, one such way is through the payment of contingent fees to contact officials to secure federal contracts. Contingent fees may be any commission, percentage, brokerage, or other fee that is contingent upon the success that a person or concern has in securing a government contract. The federal government generally prohibits contractors from paying contingent fees in exchange for obtaining government contracts. This prohibition includes the payment of contingent fees between private parties or other contractual arrangements that contemplate a contingent fee in violation of procurement statutes or regulations.

Notably, FAR 3.404 requires contracting officers (CO) to include the clause at Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.203-5 “Covenant Against Contingent Fees” in sealed bid procurements. Similarly, the covenant is also included in negotiated contracts in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 2306 and 41 U.S.C. § 3901. The clause is mandatory in all non-commercial product or services contracts above the simplified acquisition threshold, requiring the contractor to provide a warranty against contingent fees. Specifically, the contractor must provide a warranty that no person or agency has been retained to secure the contract with an agreement or understanding that contemplates the payment of a contingent fee. When the contractor breaches or violates this warranty, the government has the right to annul the contract without liability. In such situations, the government may also deduct the contingent fee from the final contract price or otherwise recover the full amount of the contingent fee.

An exception applies to bona fide employees of government contractors who are subject to the contractor’s supervision and control as to time, place, and manner of performance. Such contractor employees may be paid contingent fees if they do not exert or propose to exert improper influence to solicit or obtain government contracts. These employees must also not hold themselves out as having the ability to obtain government contracts through the exertion of improper influence. Furthermore, an exemption exists for “bona fide agencies,” which are defined as established commercial or selling agencies, maintained by a contractor for the purpose of securing business that neither exerts nor proposes to exert improper influence to solicit or obtain government contracts nor holds itself out as being able to obtain government contracts by exercising improper influence.

As an example, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has previously found a violation of the covenant when a contractor hired the services of a consulting firm on a commissioned fee basis to help secure a government contract, when the owner of the consulting firm provided training to the awarding government agency as a “special Government employee.” In that case, the court held that the owner of the consulting firm could not obtain a commission fee or compensation for services rendered to help the contractor obtain the government contract. Importantly, the exertion or the possibility of exertion of improper influence is a key consideration in determining whether the covenant against contingent fees has been violated. Additionally, even when a contingent fee is permitted under one of the limited exemptions, the fee should not be inequitable or exorbitant when compared to the services performed.

The covenant against contingent fees in federal contracting typically prohibits contractors from paying contingent fees to help secure federal contracts. Therefore, contractors should carefully review contracts with agents hired with the specific purpose of contacting government officials to secure government business. Contractors should ensure that contractual arrangements with such agents do not contemplate a contingent fee. While contingent fees may be permitted in certain situations, under no circumstances can an agent exert or propose to exert improper influence to help the contractor obtain government contracts. By understanding the covenant against contingent fees and its overall framework and exemptions, contractors can avoid inadvertent breaches or violations of the covenant when seeking outside assistance in obtaining federal government contracts.

This Federal Procurement Insight is provided as a general summary of the applicable law in the practice area and does not constitute legal advice. Contractors wishing to learn more are encouraged to consult the TILLIT LAW PLLC Client Portal or Contact Us to determine how the law would apply in a specific situation.

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The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 9.5 generally requires the Government to avoid, address, or mitigate significant conflicts of interest to prevent giving unfair competitive advantage to offerors. Contracting officers (CO) are responsible for avoiding and addressing potential conflicts of interest. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) will generally uphold a CO’s determination involving a potential conflict of interest unless the determination is unreasonable or otherwise unsupported by the record. A conflict of interest involving biased ground rules exists when a contractor performing on a government contract sets the ground rules for competition for that government contract. In doing so, the contractor knowingly or unknowingly gives itself a competitive advantage. An example of a procurement involving biased ground rules is a contractor competing for a contract for which it helped develop the statement of work. Depending on the specific facts, contractors may prevent companies who set the ground rules for a procurement from competing in that procurement through a pre or post-award protest. In bringing such protests, the protestors must present evidence that the ground rules for the competition were biased, giving an unfair advantage to a bidder or an awardee.

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It is common for individuals to switch roles between the public and private sectors in the federal contracts industry. Also known as the "revolving door" in industry parlance, this practice often leads to government officials leaving their positions to work for federal contractors or contractor employees obtaining roles in government agencies that regulate or award contracts to their former employers. As one can imagine, this practice can and often does lead to actual or perceived conflicts of interest at various stages of the procurement process. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) subpart 9.5 describes three types of organizational conflicts of interest (OCI) that may arise during the procurement lifecycle. These include biased ground rules, unequal access to non-public information, and impaired objectivity. Moreover, FAR § 3.1101 defines personal conflict of interest as a situation in which a covered employee has a financial interest, personal activity, or relationship that could impair the employee's ability to act impartially and in the government's best interest when performing under the contract.

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The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) prescribes the use of Limitation of Costs or Funds clauses in cost-reimbursable contracts that are either fully or incrementally funded. These clauses require contractors to follow specific procedures to notify the contracting officer (CO) when anticipated costs on a cost-reimbursable contract exceed a pre-determined threshold (typically 75 percent of the estimated costs), provide a revised estimate of costs for the remainder of the contract, and seek the CO’s approval to obtain additional funding. While FAR § 32.706-2 instructs the CO to insert the limitation of cost clause (LOCC) at FAR 52.232-20 in fully funded cost-reimbursable contracts, it instructs the CO to utilize the limitation of funds clause (LOFC) at FAR 52.232-22 in cost-reimbursable contracts that are incrementally funded.

These otherwise nearly identical clauses serve the dual purpose of protecting the contractor and the government from unfunded cost overruns. Firstly, the contractor is protected from the risk of the government’s unexpected refusal to pay additional costs due to the prior approval requirements imposed by the LOCC and the LOFC. Secondly, the LOCC and the LOFC protect the contractor by relieving any performance obligations on the contract beyond the stated cost limitation in the absence of the CO’s approval of a raised ceiling. Meanwhile, the clauses also protect the government by limiting the inherent risks of overpayments in cost-reimbursable contracts. That is, the LOCC and LOFC help prevent unnecessary cost overruns by requiring the contractor to go through an approval process to obtain additional funding before continuing performance on the contract beyond the contract’s stated cost ceiling. By setting a cost limitation ceiling, the government effectively protects itself from unexpectedly having to pay the contractor more than the anticipated costs set aside for the contract. The use of the LOCC or the LOFC also discourages contractors from utilizing unrealistically low pricing to obtain a competitive advantage during the solicitation stage of a cost-reimbursable contract.

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*** REGULATORY UPDATE: On November 12, 2024, the General Services Administration, Department of Defense, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration issued an interim rule, which went into effect the same day. The interim rule amended the Federal Acquisition Regulation to clarify System of Award Management (SAM) pre-award registration requirements. The rule revises the solicitation provision at FAR 52.204-7 to clarify that while an offeror must be registered in SAM at the time of offer submission and at the time of contract award, the offeror need not be registered in SAM at every moment in between those two points. Accordingly, parts of the Government Accountability Office and the Court of Federal Claims decisions that levy a requirement for offerors to maintain a continuous, uninterrupted, SAM registration during the entirety of the pre-award process are no longer applicable.***

The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires procuring agencies to include various mandatory provisions in solicitations to protect the government’s contractual and policy interests. For instance, the government must include the provision at FAR 52.204-7 “System for Award Management” in all solicitations unless specific exceptions apply. In recent bid protest decisions, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has held that when the government fails to include a mandatory provision in a solicitation, it may not then rely on that provision to exclude prospective offerors from competition. Additionally, there is no requirement that mandatory FAR provisions must be incorporated into a solicitation by operation of law when they have been omitted. Consequently, the effects of such exclusion on the government’s award decision may be somewhat unpredictable. Notably, despite the general rule that government contracts be interpreted in accordance with the included terms, conditions, and clauses, and unless a deviation has been obtained – certain mandatory clauses (e.g. termination for convenience clause) are read into federal contracts whether or not expressly included in the contract under the Christian Doctrine.

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Unpacking the Covenant Against Contingent Fees in Federal Contracting

TILLIT LAW Federal Procurement Insights