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Filing Protests in Acquisitions with Higher Ranked Intervening Offerors

In order to have the necessary standing to file a protest at the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a protester must qualify as an interested party. The GAO’s bid protest regulations define an interested party as an actual or prospective bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of a contract or by the failure to award a contract. A protester may challenge the procuring agency’s evaluation of the awardee’s proposal as an interested party when there is a reasonable possibility that its proposal would be next in line for award if the protest is sustained. In post-award protests with an intervening offeror between the awardee and the protester, the protester’s economic interest may be considered too remote to qualify as an interested party to raise certain challenges against the awardee’s proposal. This is because when there is an intervening offeror that would be next in line for award should the protester’s protest be sustained, that intervening offeror is deemed to have a greater economic interest in the procurement. To establish standing in such procurements, the protester must challenge the agency’s evaluation of the intervening offeror to either show that it possesses the necessary economic interest to raise the pertinent challenges or otherwise demonstrate that its competitive position is subject to change based on the errors it identifies in the government’s evaluation.

In B-423259.3; B-423259.4, a bid protest decision issued on July 17, 2025, the GAO declined to address all but one of the protester’s allegations after determining that the protester’s economic interests were too remote due to the presence of an intervening offeror. The Defense Health Agency (DHA) issued a task order award for test and evaluation information technology services after conducting a best value tradeoff analysis. During the evaluation, the source selection authority compared the protester’s proposal to an intervening offeror and found that the intervening offeror’s proposal represented better value to the agency. Following this comparison, the DHA conducted a tradeoff analysis between the proposals submitted by the intervening offeror and the awardee and determined that the awardee’s proposal represented best value to the agency, primarily due to a 58 percent difference in the proposed price. In the post-award protest that followed, the protester challenged the DHA’s best-value tradeoff analysis that compared its proposal to that of the intervening offeror. The protester also disputed the sufficiency of the tradeoff analysis between its proposal and that of the awardee. Finally, the protester challenged the agency’s evaluation of the awardee’s past performance and also alleged that the awardee had violated the solicitation’s limitation on subcontracting clause.

The GAO first addressed the agency’s tradeoff analysis comparing the proposals of the intervening offeror and the protester but found no basis to conclude that the agency had failed to reasonably conduct or document its tradeoff decision. After making this determination, the GAO declined to entertain the remainder of the protester’s allegations because the protester was deemed to lack the necessary economic interest to raise them. The decision noted that the remainder of the protester’s allegations concerned the agency’s evaluation of the awardee’s proposal. The GAO pointed out that the DHA source selection authority had conclusively and definitively determined that the intervening offeror’s proposal represented a better value to the agency than that of the protester. Under these circumstances, even if the protester’s allegations concerning the awardee’s proposal were successful, the intervening offeror would be next in line for award. The decision noted that the protester had failed to raise the allegations concerning the past performance evaluation and the violation of limitation on subcontracting clause with respect to the intervening offeror’s proposal. Consequently, the protester had no discernable path to contract award even if these arguments were successful and the GAO declined to address the remaining allegations because the protester was not considered an interested party to raise them.

In post-award bid protests, a protester may challenge the procuring agency’s evaluation of the awardee’s proposal when there is a reasonable possibility that the protester’s proposal would be next in line for award if its protest is sustained. In practice, this means that when there is an intervening offeror between the protester and the awardee, that intervening offeror is considered next in line for award in case the protest challenging the award is sustained. In such protests, the protester does not possess the required standing to challenge certain aspects of the awardee’s proposal because its economic interest is considered too remote to qualify as an interested party. Therefore, the protester must challenge the intervening offeror(s) proposal to establish that it possesses the necessary interest to raise the relevant challenges or otherwise demonstrate that its competitive position is likely to change based on the errors it identifies in the government’s evaluation. In the absence of such a showing, however, the GAO will decline to entertain the merits of the protester’s arguments with respect to the evaluation of the awardee’s proposal.

This Bid Protest Insight is provided as a general summary of the applicable law in the practice area and does not constitute legal advice. Contractors wishing to learn more are encouraged to consult the TILLIT LAW PLLC Client Portal or Contact Us to determine how the law would apply in a specific situation.

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Prospective contractors may raise pre-award protests challenging solicitations that contain flawed evaluation methodologies. While the government has discretion in selecting the appropriate evaluation methodologies for fulfilling its procurement needs, the stated evaluation scheme must generally provide a meaningful basis for differentiating between offerors, while supporting a reasonable award decision. Pre-award protests that challenge the government’s evaluation methodologies are distinct from post-award protests filed due to flawed agency evaluations or disparate treatment of offerors. Such pre-award challenges are raised in response to the agency's planned approach to evaluate one or more solicitation factors, rather than a failure to adequately evaluate the proposals.

While it is within the agency’s discretion to select an appropriate method to assess offeror pricing, the agency may not use an evaluation method that produces a flawed or misleading result. In B-409872.2, the GAO sustained a pre-award bid protest because it found that the solicitation’s price evaluation methodology could produce misleading evaluation results when analyzing the competitiveness of price proposals. The solicitation issued by the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA), contemplated an indefinite-delivery requirements contract for fresh fruit and vegetables for military commissary stores in South Korea, Japan, and Guam. The commissary stores provided groceries and household items to members of the military and other authorized patrons. The incumbent contractor responsible for fulfilling the fresh fruit and vegetables requirement for the commissary store protested the solicitation terms for allegedly containing a flawed pricing evaluation methodology.

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Under best-value evaluation schemes, government evaluators are typically required to qualitatively assess the offerors’ proposals based on the stated evaluation criteria in the solicitation to determine which proposal represents the best value to the government. If the evaluation scheme provides that the procuring agency would evaluate the “extent” to which a proposal meets a particular requirement, offerors may reasonably expect that their proposal exceeding the government’s stated requirements would be evaluated more favorably than a competing proposal that meets the minimum requirements. In such best-value procurements, the agency must usually identify and assess potential discriminators between the offerors’ proposals in addition to evaluating whether the proposals are acceptable under the stated criteria in the RFP. Disappointed offerors may challenge a procuring agency’s best-value determination as flawed when one or more underlying evaluations upon which that tradeoff analysis is based are unreasonable.

In B-421871.3; B-421871.4, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) sustained a bid protest implicating these best-value evaluation principles in a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) procurement for financial and program management support services. The underlying task order (TO) was issued in support of the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office under DHS’ Program Management Administrative, Operation and Technical Services II (PACTS II) indefinite-delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract. The request for proposal (RFP) contemplated a time-and-materials (T&M) award to be issued on a best-value basis upon the consideration of four factors. The “technical capability and approach” was the most important non-price factor followed by “management approach” and “past performance” factors in decreasing order of importance. The non-price factors, when combined, were considered more important than the “price” factor. Furthermore, the RFP’s evaluation criteria outlined an adjectival confidence ratings framework for the evaluation of non-price factors, with “High Confidence” being the highest possible adjectival rating. The RFP also provided “positive” and “negative” evaluation elements that were assigned when an offeror’s proposal demonstrated an understanding (or lack thereof) of RFP requirements. Evaluators were also required to consider the soundness of the offerors’ proposed approaches to accomplish the relevant objectives.

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The Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) bid protest regulations require protesters to provide a detailed statement of the legal and factual grounds of protest. While the GAO does not require protesters to file formal briefs or other technical forms of pleadings or motions, protesters must nevertheless file concise and logically arranged protests that clearly state legally sufficient protest grounds. On July 14, 2025, the GAO submitted a proposal in response to Section 885 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, clarifying and enhancing its pleading standard. While this new pleading standard is not a significant change from the previous standard, it provides added clarification that protesters’ bare allegations are insufficient to meet GAO’s pleading requirements. Under this new standard, protesters must provide, at a minimum, credible allegations that are supported by evidence and are sufficient, if uncontradicted, to establish the likelihood of the protester’s claim of improper agency action. Stated another way, protesters must provide more than a bare allegation, such that the allegation is supported by some explanation and evidence that establishes the likelihood the protester will prevail in its claim. In practical terms, the GAO will continue to dismiss protests or specific allegations within that are based on speculation, factual inaccuracies, or flawed legal assumptions.

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It is a fundamental tenet of government contracts that procuring agencies treat all offerors equally. In this regard, adjudicative forums have long held that procuring agencies must provide all offerors with a common basis for preparing and submitting proposals. Such equal treatment necessarily requires the government to evaluate proposals of all offerors impartially and evenhandedly against the solicitation requirements and the evaluation criteria. Furthermore, once the evaluation is complete, agencies must adequately document their award decision, which should reflect the equal application of the stated criteria to all proposals. If an agency disparately evaluates offerors with respect to the same solicitation requirements, it may be subject to a post-award protest. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviews protests alleging disparate treatment by examining the record to determine whether the agency’s evaluation decision was reasonable and in accordance with the evaluation factors provided in the request for proposals (RFP). The GAO will sustain the protest and typically recommend a reevaluation if it determines that the agency treated the offerors’ proposals disparately or unequally, such as by evaluating the protester’s proposal using a stricter standard than the awardee’s proposal.

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Filing Protests in Acquisitions with Higher Ranked Intervening Offerors

Bid Protest Insights | TILLIT LAW PLLC